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ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: WHICH POLICIES WORKED
*
 
COLIN LAWSON AND HAIFENG WANG 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper employs a conditional growth convergence framework to 
reassess the link between growth and structural reform in the 1991-2000 transition 
process of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. We find that the 
dominant link between transition indicators and growth is negative. There is clear 
evidence that price liberalisation, enterprise reform and competition policy are 
negatively associated with growth. By contrast, only trade liberalisation has a 
significant positive association with growth, but no significant link is found between 
growth and financial sector reforms.  
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The former Soviet Union and eastern European states in the 1990s saw the 
transition from socialism to capitalism, and the consequent economic shift from 
centrally planned to market economies. This transition, in contrast to the economic 
transformation of China and Vietnam, was at first accompanied by a significant output 
decline, followed in the second half of the 1990s by a slow recovery. It was 
characterised by a very complex process of transformation in institutions, economic 
structures and behaviour (Martha De Melo, Denizer Cevdet and Alan Gelb 1996). That 
process, a traverse between economic systems, has been so rare that initially there was 
no relevant economic theory. But at an empirical level a literature has emerged that 
explores the links between transition and growth (De Melo, Cevdet and Gelb 1996; Paul 
Brenton, Gros Daniel and Vandille Guy 1997; Andrew Berg, Eduardo R. Borensztein, 
Ratna Sahay, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 1999; Philippe Aghion and Mark Schankerman 
1999; Louise Grogan and Luc Moers 2001; Elisabetta Falcetti, Martin Raiser and Peter 
Sanfey 2002; Bruno Merlevede 2003; and Elisabetta Falcetti, Tatiana Lysenko and Peter 
Sanfey 2005). This literature has tried to link progress, as measured by European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition indicators, to growth - though 
the precise causality is elusive. 
Initial conditions, macroeconomic stability, and institutional and hence structural 
change are the main concerns in the transition literature (Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey 
2002; Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey 2005). Both the mainstream growth literature and 
the recent studies of transition economies show that initial conditions are inversely 
related to growth – widely understood as conditional growth convergence (Robert J. 
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin 1992; Gregory N. Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. 
Weil 1992; Brenton, Izvorski and Van Rooden 1998; Gary Krueger and Marek Ciolko 
1998; Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 1999; Stanley Fischer and Ratna 
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Sahay 2000; De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Teney 2001; Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey 
2002).  
There is little disagreement that macroeconomic stability, measured by the 
inflation rate, is strongly and positively related to growth (Robert J. Barro 1997, p.13-
19; Brenton, Izvorski and Van Rooden 1998; Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and 
Zettelmeyer 1999; Fischer and Sahay 2000; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003, p.461-
496). Moreover, the investment decision is an important component of the growth 
literature. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); Sala-i-Martin (1997); and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003) demonstrate positive links between growth and the ratio of investment 
(saving) to GDP, though the causality is sometimes disputable (Barro 1997). 
However, there is less agreement on how to measure institutional or structural 
change. But assessing specific structural changes, which are mainly driven by 
exogenous policy changes, is also of interest because as the evolution of policy reforms 
can be arrayed on a scale related to the degree they mimic the development of economic 
systems, they can be used to compare governments’ performance. However, policy 
changes are not necessarily exogenous, as some are responses to economic 
performance.  
Transition indicators, such as those for liberalisation, privatisation, enterprise 
reform, and financial institutions, measure an economy’s institutional structure and thus 
are likely to reflect the evolution of policy reforms. Most studies (De Melo, Cevdet and 
Gelb 1996; Brenton, Gros, and Vandille 1997; Aghion and Schankerman 1999; Berg, 
Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 1999) have found a positive correlation between 
growth and these indicators. Yet what most scholars and citizens of transition states 
remember is the economic decline that accompanied the first phases of substantial 
transition.   
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We argue that economic performance may be affected by both the level of a 
transition policy – the level effect, and by its change rate – the speed effect. The 
conventional wisdom is that an increase in the level of structural reform, to more closely 
mimic an advanced market system, automatically raises output. But in practice, policies 
that are effective in one system may require some adaptation to succeed in another. For 
example, they likely require a change in social and individual behaviour. Mistakes were 
inevitable and hence lessons had to be learnt in a unique trial and error process. So in 
itself a change of policy from one level to another does not necessarily lead to 
immediate growth. 
The speed effects due to the change rate of a transition policy may also have 
positive or negative output consequences. In the early transition years negative speed 
effects appeared to be common, as the destruction of the old system was dramatic, in 
contrast to the relatively slow development of the new system. De Melo, Cevdet and 
Gelb (1996), using switching regressions, gave the first econometric account. Oleh 
Havrylyshyn, Ivailo Izvorski and Ron Van Rooden (1998), Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, 
and Zettelmeyer (1999) and Merlevede (2003), using lagged regressions, also provided 
evidence for negative early speed effects, though they cautioned that the results were 
not robust.  
It is inefficient to employ a single policy variable to represent both level and 
speed effects in a lagged specification - especially when the data period is as short as a 
decade. Some researchers assume that current and several lagged values of a variable 
can capture respectively the immediate and long run effects. But there is no prior 
information to help identify the lag order, and the short data series and loss of degrees 
of freedom make it impractical to conduct a test for lag order.  
We propose an alternative approach where the transition policy index variable 
reflects the level effect, and the rate-of-change of the policy index captures the speed 
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effect. A similar rate-of-change variable was studied by Berta Heybey and Peter Murrell 
(1999). Unfortunately they neglected the level variable. In the light of our framework, it 
is likely that while they picked up the costs of transition, they probably underestimated 
benefits.      
Introducing a speed variable as well as a level one has at least three advantages. 
First, the speed - a change rate - is a unit free measurement. Second, it can indicate the 
volatility of the policy change. Finally, at minimum data cost it allows an investigation 
of short-run effects or policy shocks. Many previous studies, based on level variables, 
likely focus on the benefits of transition, but few addressed the costs that are more likely 
to be reflected by the corresponding speed variables.  
Moreover, the institutional or structural change is multi-dimensional and ought 
to be measured by a range of transition indicators. Indicators vary in importance and 
hence picking a single indicator would likely distort the real picture of the transition 
process. Clearly we need a general model encompassing a range of policies indicated by 
a group of transition indicators. But few earlier studies explore this route, partly due to 
data availability and partly due to concerns about potential problems from 
multicollinearity.  
This paper tackles these issues, using panel data methods. Our focus is on the 
possible relationship between transition indicators and growth, not only because these 
indicators have practical policy importance, but also because they provide a 
comparative basis to assess economic performance. We embed the relationship in a 
conditional growth convergence literature. Conditioning it on commonly used variables 
– initial conditions, inflation and investment – provides a benchmark interpretation of 
the transition experience.  
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I. METHODOLOGY 
Our framework follows the conditional growth convergence approach widely 
used in the growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Francesco Caselli, Gerardo Esquivel, and 
Fernando Lefort 1996; Barro 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003). This involves a 
regression of per capita growth rates on an initial condition plus a number of additional 
explanatory variables. We focus on the level and speed transition variables, generated 
from EBRD transition indicators, which largely represent exogenous policy choices. As 
some assert that the transition indicators are endogenous (Heybey and Murrell 1999; 
Campos and Corricelli 2002; Merlevede 2003), we formally test their exogeneity.   
We use the initial condition, inflation rate, and the investment to GDP ratio to 
capture the convergence mechanism, partly because the three control variables behave 
consistently in both the growth and the transition literatures, and partly because of the 
data limitations in transition economies. For the annual data employed in this study, the 
initial condition, measured by per capita output in the previous period, is used to capture 
the output level of the economy
1
,  
The limitations of transition data force us to use annual data over a decade, 
though the conditional convergence framework has previously been used to study 
variations in five-year and even ten-year average data for much longer periods, partly 
due to concerns about business cycle effects, partly due to the data restriction on 
education variables. But annual data allows the full use of information, and business 
cycle effects can be controlled in part by the use of inflation and investment variables, 
and in part by the use of an array of time dummies, in a two-factor panel data 
specification. We further examine the possible effects of inflation and investment 
variables.   The education variables are not addressed here for the limitation of data. 
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Panel data methods are extensively used in empirical growth studies, and also in 
some transition papers (De Melo, Cevdet and Gelb 1996; Brenton, Izvorski and Van 
Rooden 1998; Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 1999; Fischer and Sahay 
2000; Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey 2002; Merlevede 2003). They help to reduce small 
sample problems and thus the possible problem of multicollinearity. Within the 
conditional convergence framework, our panel data model is specified as:    
( 1 )  ti
Z
titititi urZXr ,,3,2,10, +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ββββ       
i = 1, 2, … , N  and  t = 1, 2, … , T 
where ri,t is the change rate of real output; i and t denote respectively countries and 
periods; Xi,t is the vector of control variables; Zi,t is the set of transition indicators  - the 
level variables; and Ztir , is the corresponding change rate of Zi,t - the speed variables;  β0, 
β1, β2 and β3 are parameters; and ui,t is the error term that can be further decomposed 
into a two-factor error components disturbances specification: 
( 2 )  tititi vddu ,, ++=        
  i = 1, 2, … , N  and  t = 1, 2, … , T 
the dummies di are the unobservable individual country effects, dt are the associated 
unobservable time effects, and vi,t is an independent stochastic error term. 
Treating error components di and dt differently results respectively in fixed 
effects and random effects models. In the fixed effects case, only vi,t is an independent 
stochastic error term. di is allowed to capture the individual country effect and dt to 
reflect the time difference – a dynamic property. Both di and dt are assumed to be fixed 
parameters that can be estimated in the model using least squares dummy variables 
(LSDV). 
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The random effects model treats di and dt and vi,t as stochastically independent 
disturbances. It can be estimated by generalised least squares (GLS). However, the 
random effects model is not statistically superior to the corresponding fixed effects 
model, though it has some appealing properties, such as modelling ethnic, religious, and 
colonial dummies. In practice a comparison can be made using the Hausman Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) chi-squared statistic (Jerry Hausman 1978). A large value of the 
Hausman statistic favours the fixed effects model.     
With a large number of variables, multi-collinearity and hence the robustness 
and consistency of estimates might became a problem (Ross Levine and David Renelt 
1992; Edward F. Leamer 1983; 1985). Sala-i-Martin (1997) has argued that as pure 
robustness of parameter estimates seldom exists, we should, while retaining the concept, 
opt for a wider comparison of parameter significance levels. Carmen Fernandez, 
Eduardo Ley and Mark Steel (2001) support this view.  
We investigate robustness parsimoniously in a two-stage process. In the first 
stage, we use partial regression to study each transition indicator conditioned on the 
common control variables within the conditional growth convergence framework. The 
transition indicator is decomposed into two components - level and speed variables. 
This can help provide some primary information and also avoid the possibility of 
multicollinearity between the transitional variables.  
We examine the exogeneity of the transition indicators, employing a Hausman 
test – also known as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Endogeneity is of wide concern in 
empirical studies, and of increasing interest in studies of transition economies (Heybey 
and Murrell 1999; Campos and Corricelli 2002; Merlevede 2003). But there are few 
empirical studies that test for the problem. When the exogeneity of a variable is 
rejected, we tackle it with a two-stage instrumental variables LSDV regression. 
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The second stage conducts a general to specific reduction process, incorporating 
the core ideas of robust analysis from Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997). All the variables are pooled in a regression defined by (1) and (2). The reduction 
process uses the following procedures and criteria:  
i. Start with the general regression. All the transition variables are 
classified by their level of significance. Attention focuses both on the 
variables with less than a certain significance level, say 10%, and on the 
least significant variable. 
ii.  Remove the least significant variable in the regression, and then check 
the impact of this on the initially significant variables. The least 
significant variable can be deleted if all of the initially significant 
variables remain so. Otherwise the insignificant variable is retained. 
iii.       Repeat step ii for the next least significant variable, and then continue 
until all variables are above the chosen significance level, or until the 
removal of any beneath that level pulls those above it, beneath it. 
iv.       Conduct a joint F-test (asymptotically equivalent LM or likelihood ratio 
(LR) test) on the deleted insignificant variables to examine whether the 
model reduction process was statistically not inappropriate. 
v.       Practically the deleted variables can be used as instruments to deal with 
endogeneity issues. Alternative instruments are lagged variables. 
The reduced form is likely to have several advantages over the general 
framework. Its fewer variables reduce the risk of multicollinearity and increase the 
degrees of freedom. The screening process for variables and consequent model 
evolution increases the efficiency of parameter estimates. The plausibility of the model 
evolution process can be easily tested by an F test or equivalent LM and LR in step (iv).    
The further discussions largely rely on the results from the second stage analysis.  
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II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
GDP growth rates, annual inflation rates and transition indicators are from 
EBRD annual Transition Reports (EBRD 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 
2002). Investment as a share of GDP is from World Bank Annual Reports and World 
Bank Development Indicators (World Bank 2000). The real GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1995 US dollars makes use of EBRD annual real 
growth rates, World Bank data on 1995 GDP at PPP, and population. 
The EBRD’s Transition Report (2002) contains 37 series of indicators organised 
into seven dimensions. For three dimensions: infrastructure, legal environment, and the 
social sector there is little data. So we concentrate on the remaining four dimensions: 
liberalisation, privatisation, enterprises, and financial institutions - selecting two 
indicators for each dimension. Table I lists all variables in three categories  
Twenty-five out of twenty-seven transition economies dealt with by the EBRD 
are included. Bosnia-Hertzgovina, and Serbia and Montenegro are excluded, due to data 
availability. The data set generally covers 1991-2000, though with a few gaps. A model 
with two period lagged variables further loses the first two period data points. Economic 
transition was in fact launched in different countries at different times (EBRD 2000) 
and the early years were important in reflecting and shaping the character of the 
transition. Poland and Hungary began in 1989, followed in 1990 by the rest of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and South Eastern Europe (SEE) excluding Albania. Albania 
and the three Baltic States began the process in 1991, followed the next year by the 
twelve members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Therefore 1991-2000 
data provides a good test of transition regularities. EBRD transition indicators were 
introduced in 1997 and recorded by the integers 1 to 4, with pluses and minuses, valued 
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for aggregation at 0.3, indicating slightly better or worse achievements. The 1991-1996 
indices were added retrospectively by EBRD in 2000. 
Table II presents the correlation matrix for the variables. The correlations 
between growth and the levels of the transition indicators are positive, but those 
between growth and the changes in the transition indicators are negative. The absolute 
values of the former correlations are larger than those of the latter, except for price 
liberalisation. While the correlation coefficient between growth and inflation is large 
and negative, those between growth and both the initial condition and the investment 
share are small and respectively positive and negative. Clearly, the latter two correlation 
signs, associated with initial condition and investment, seem to be inconsistent with the 
consensus in the conventional growth convergence literature. 
 
III RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Table III presents the results of the first stage analysis - the partial regressions. 
Clearly, the two-way fixed panel data method is statistically preferable over alternative 
specifications. For instance, the F-test statistics for fixed country and time dummies 
show that fixed effects are significant. Meanwhile, the Hausman test statistics for the 
competition from random effects reject the random effects specification.  
All three control-variables are statistically significant with the expected sign, 
which is consistent across alternative models, though the convergence coefficients seem 
to be too large. This primarily indicates that the conditional growth convergence 
framework is suitable to address the transition process. The abnormally large 
convergence coefficients will be explained later. 
The coefficients of the transition variables reveal some striking results. As can 
be seen, all the other four significant coefficients, except for that of the level of trade 
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liberalization, are negative. The only significant positive coefficient is on the level of 
trade liberalization. It, at 0.0165, is the smallest of the five significant coefficients. In 
contrast, the magnitude of the speed of price liberalisation, at 0.0734, is more than 
double that of any other transition variable. This suggests a clear negative association 
between economic transition and growth.  
The endogeneity diagnosed by the Hausman exogeneity test is found in the level 
and the speed of trade liberalisation, the speed of small-scale privatisation, the level of 
enterprise reform, and banking sector reform. But the exogeneity of all three control-
variables is not rejected. The Hausman test uses all the insignificant transition variables 
as instruments, for the insignificant variables are less correlated with the dependent 
variable but more likely associated with transition variables. Clearly the insignificant 
variables are part of the whole package of transition policies, in which these transition 
policies are likely to be interdependent. Alternatively we can use the lagged variables as 
instruments, with which trade liberalisation and enterprise reform are diagnosed as 
endogenous. The drawback of the alternative approach is the reduction of the sample 
size and increase in the number of the instruments. In practice, choosing appropriate 
instrumental variables is often open to challenge, even though the Sargan over-
identification test can be used to examine the choice.  
To tackle the endogeneity issues, we re-estimate the model with instrumental 
variables using two-stage LSDV methods. The instruments are the same as those for the 
exogeneity test. The results are reported in table IV. As can be seen, all the significant 
coefficients are negative and there are no significant positive coefficients reported. 
However, the results in table IV are not very consistent with their counterparts in table 
III. This is likely due to the recovery of the information embedded in those instruments, 
in particular, when the number of instrumental variables is relatively large. In addition, 
the Sargan over-identification tests are also reported and do not reject the instruments.  
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Table V reports the results of the second stage analysis - the model reduction 
from general to specific form. Panels V.A and V.B are respectively the model 
specifications of the general and the specific equation. The model evolution from the 
general to the specific is statistically consistent and acceptable. As can be seen, the 
significance levels for most parameters increase from the general to specific form, 
which suggests that the evolution process is stable and consistent. Second, the adjusted 
R
2
 suggests that the reduced form panel V.B fits the data better than the general one that 
contains more variables. Third, the small F test statistic for the joint restrictions on the 
reduced form also suggests that the reduction leading to the specific form is not 
statistically inappropriate. Fourth, the two F-test statistics for fixed country and time 
dummies show these fixed effects are significant. But the Hausman test statistic for the 
random against fixed effects does not strongly reject the random effects model, even in 
the reduced form.  
More interestingly, five of six significant transition variables are negative and 
again only the level of trade liberalisation is significantly positive. This is rather 
consistent with the first stage result. In addition there is no evidence of endogeneity 
problems in the explanatory variables of panel V.B. For comparison, we re-estimated 
panel V.B using two-stage LSDV with two alternative instruments. The results are 
presented in panels V.C and V.D. Again the Sargan over-identification test does not 
reject the application of instruments. We discuss the implications of the results in 
greater detail later.  
Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, excluding two control variables – the inflation 
rate and the investment ratio - does not significantly alter the general results of the 
transition variables. An example is provided in Panel V.E - an alternative regression of 
panel V.B. This helps rule out the possible risk that the co-movement of the control 
variables in the annual data might distort the results of the transition process.   
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III.B. Control Variables: Initial Condition, Inflation Rate and Investment Ratio 
The three control variables, to some extent, help to reveal the convergence 
property of the transition economies. Tables III, IV and V show all the three control 
variables are significant with the signs expected in the mainstream literature. The 
hypothesis of conditional convergence and a positive relation between growth and 
investment are well captured by the suggested models.  
The coefficients on the initial condition, usually interpreted as the convergence 
coefficients, are in a range from 0.146 to 0.204. They are very large in comparison to 
those of around 2.5% suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Markiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992), Barro (1997) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). However, Nazrul Islam 
(1995), and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) report higher convergence coefficients 
in the range 0.056-0.098 estimated from more preferable panel data methods. It is 
argued that most economies are usually not very far from their steady states.  
The large convergence coefficients reported here can be understood from two 
aspects. On the one hand they are likely in part to reflect some type of “recovery” 
phenomenon, in which output rebounds from the unjustifiably large output falls of the 
early transition period. Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2005) identify this type of 
phenomenon. On the other hand, a systematic downward estimate of the output, would 
result in an overestimate of the convergence coefficient. Friedrich Schneider and 
Dominik H. Enste (2000) show transition economies have large unreported economies, 
relative to the advanced market economies.  
There is a positive link between the inflation rate, reflecting macroeconomic 
stability, and growth. More specifically a high inflation rate signals a lack of 
government control over fiscal and monetary policy, which can not only destroy the 
confidence of investors but also distort the market mechanism. The hyperinflation rates 
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observed in transition economies have been widely seen as one of the causes of 
economic recession during the 1990s (Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 1999). 
In contrast, Campos and Corricelli (2002) argue that inflation is likely to be the result of 
particular policies. But we have not found statistical evidence for the endogeneity of 
inflation.  
The significant positive link between investment share and growth is also widely 
reported in the growth literature, but the direction of causality is contested (Blomstrom, 
Magnus, and Zejan. 1996; Barro 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003). For the transition 
economies, the initial output slump and high inflation severely damaged investor 
confidence. So it seems reasonable to posit an initial causation running from growth to 
investment. However, our results do not reject a causality running from investment to 
growth.   
To sum up, the results from three control variables provide a rather consistent 
and convincing source of information on the transition economy, which is in line with 
the general growth literature. However in table II the simple correlation coefficients 
between growth and the control variables likely disguise a more complex reality. Taken 
together the results for the control variables firmly place the findings for these transition 
economies in the mainstream of empirical growth studies. 
III.C. Liberalisation of Prices and Trade 
Liberalisation is a core issue in the transition literature. This paper examines two 
aspects – price and trade liberalisation. It provides more detailed and hence more 
accurate information than the previously used Cumulative Liberalisation Index (CLI) of 
De Melo, Cevdet and Gelb (1996). The CLI was a weighted average of three indicators, 
reflecting internal markets, external markets, and private sector entry. By contrast we 
explore price and trade liberalisation as well as other policies, in much greater detail.  
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Both tables III and V report significant negative coefficients for the speed 
variable of price liberalisation, though its levels are insignificantly negative, and hence 
it was removed in the second stage analysis. As can be seen, the magnitudes of its speed 
variable are much larger than those of other significant transition variables. This result 
is consistent in both stages of the analysis, which suggests that price liberalisation was 
accomplished at a significant economic cost – a transition cost. The policy implication 
is that price liberalisation is not straightforward and rapid change is not directly 
beneficial. This view is strengthened as price liberalisation in transition economies has 
also likely led to the higher inflation that we have already shown damages growth. 
In contrast, the second stage results suggest that trade liberalisation has a 
significant positive level effect but an insignificant negative speed effect, though these 
are not completely consistent with the first stage results. The significant positive level 
effect is consistent with typical “Washington Consensus” advice. A negative speed 
effect may reflect the fact that in the early stages of the switch from plan to market 
foreign firms were better able to seize business opportunities. An extreme example of 
such liberalisation is the collapse of East German manufacturing in the wake of 
reunification. Even in less spectacular circumstances, a very rapid switch from 
administered to market prices, where the former bore little relation to real resource costs 
or relative demands, can result in widespread large absolute and relative price changes. 
The profitability of enterprises changes dramatically and many collapse or significantly 
reduce their scale of output. Lobbying for state subsidies increases, but the tax base 
shrinks. Liberalisation in the foreign sector also leads to increased foreign competition, 
intensifying the contractionary effects of domestic liberalisation.  
Trade liberalisation is found to be endogenous in the first stage analysis. As can 
be seen in table III, the level and speed of trade liberalisation failed to pass the Hausman 
exogeneity test. It suggests that trade liberalisation is partly a consequence of the 
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transition process. Table IV provides an alternative estimate with instruments that pass 
the Sargan specification test. As can be seen, the sign of the level variable of trade 
liberalisation turns negative, though insignificant, while its speed becomes significant. 
These results may be caused by instrumental variables, for which we likely recover the 
information embedded rather than deliver a consistent estimate. As a result, the two-
stage LSDV with instruments may reveal the overall negative association between 
growth and transition indicators.    
III.D. Privatisation of Small-scale and Large-scale Enterprises 
Privatisation exhibits overall negative effects on economic growth in both the 
two stages. Tables III and V show that the speed variable of small-scale privatisation is 
significant and negative. But its level effect is insignificant and disappears in the 
general-to-specific process. By contrast, the level effect of large-scale privatisation is 
significantly negative in the general to specific process, though it is insignificant in the 
first stage analysis. Its speed effect is insignificant in both stages.  
For the transition experiences related, it is likely to expect a negative link 
between large-scale privatisation and growth, as rapid privatisation creates major social 
costs in the forms of unemployment, ill health, and poorer housing provision. 
Furthermore, large-scale privatisation often ends in bankruptcy, though efficiency gains 
may be achieved by surviving firms. As privatisation may leave both firms and 
government with excess labour to support, this dampens both actors` ability to 
restructure. Even if only the profitable parts of firms are retained, in the first instance 
output will fall. In the longer run output may rise as the profitable divisions expand, and 
that might account for the positive sign on the speed variable – getting the process over 
more quickly pays dividends.  
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The negative coefficient on the speed of small-scale privatisation likely reflects 
the transition costs to small-scale businesses. Yet the swift shift from planned to market 
systems leaves most of the small firms too little time to adapt to the market, let alone 
learn practical management and marketing skills. As a result, small-scale businesses 
have to bear tremendous costs from the lessons of their own mistakes, which largely 
absorb the expected benefits from small-scale privatisation.  
Interestingly, the speed of small-scale privatisation is also found to be 
endogenous. As can be seen in table III, it cannot pass the Hausman test. This result 
suggests that small-scale privatisation is likely to be determined by the transition 
process. Unfortunately, the two-stage LSDV estimates reported in the panels IV.B and 
V.C do not provide consistent results.   
III.E. Enterprise Reform and Competition Policy 
Tables III and IV show that enterprise reform is negatively related to growth, but 
the significance of the enterprise reform variables are not consistent. By contrast, a 
significant level effect from competition policy is consistently reported, but its speed 
effects are insignificantly positive and thus dropped in the general to specific process. A 
possible interpretation is that enterprise reform and competition policy produces much 
more pain than gain in the first stage of transition period. 
Enterprise reform mainly reflects enterprise restructuring and corporate 
governance. Blanchard (1997) singled out restructuring as a key mechanism of 
transition, noting that improving productivity may also decrease employment. If 
restructuring is rapid then inefficient units are quickly disbanded, and while productivity 
in the remaining ones may rise, overall output may fall. Our results suggest that this is 
exactly what happened.  
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Hardening the budget constraint is another key element of enterprise reform. 
Under planning, soft budget constraints and a complete absence of competition were the 
norm. So initially managers had neither experience of binding financial constraints, nor 
of fending off rivals. Even potentially profitable firms were thus vulnerable to their lack 
of experience of market discipline, and the more rapid was restructuring, the greater the 
risk.   
Both enterprise reform and large-scale privatisation were policies aimed solely 
at state owned enterprises. We have already argued that the negative coefficient on the 
large-scale privatisation policy variable probably reflects the huge costs of layoffs in a 
low productivity economy. So both policy variables are picking up different aspects of 
the same story. The effects of competition policy, which should foster the growth of the 
private sector, will reinforce the negative impacts of other policies on the output of the 
former state sector. But here, although there is some weak evidence for this in the 
general regression equation, this result does not survive the general to specific process. 
III.F. Reform of Financial Institutions 
Banking and non-banking reform aims to produce financial institutions 
consonant with a market economy. Financial reform was needed to produce an efficient 
change in the form of assets – by channelling private savings into investment. It was 
also needed to generate an effective clearing system. Non-banking reform was required 
to ensure the growth of the complementary range of financial products that provide 
more efficient inter-temporal production and consumption – from insurance to pensions. 
Although both sets of reforms might have been expected to increase growth, tables III 
and V show little convincing evidence of this link. Indeed all the level coefficients on 
these reform variables are negative, though none is significant. 
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Neither banking nor non-banking reform were early priorities for transition 
economies. Moreover the financial system under planning had limited and quite 
different functions to that of a market system. The functions were to check the progress 
of plan fulfilment, to deliver working and investment capital according to the plan, and 
to collect the private savings and channel them to the state, for consumption or 
investment. The system was a mono-bank, with no investment appraisal capabilities. 
After transition began the state banks were generally subjected to little competition and 
privatisation was often politically difficult. Although there was then a rapid growth in 
the numbers of new private banks, many were under-capitalised, and some, as offshoots 
of large cash strapped companies, did not always lend prudently. In any case the 
considerable uncertainty of the early transition years, allied to limited investment 
appraisal skills, encouraged banks to invest in government and foreign bonds, or to 
speculate on the stock exchanges, rather than to focus on domestic lending. In addition 
many states continued to use their banking system as a conduit for soft loans and other 
types of subsidies, as they had under planning. Consequently bad loans threatened the 
solvency of the system, and periodic restructuring imposed high costs on taxpayers, 
depositors and sometimes banks` owners. More recently tighter regulatory and 
supervisory regimes and increasing foreign bank penetration have significantly 
improved the performance of financial sectors. But given the late arrival of such 
improvements it is not surprising that our analysis records no significant positive effects 
from financial sector reforms.             
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IV. COMPARISON AND EXTENSION 
This section further examines both a methodological issue and a stability issue. 
First we compare our results with those from a lagged regression. Then we investigate a 
possible stability issue around 1995 by splitting the sample.   
IV.A. Comparison with Alternative Lagged Regressions 
In the literature there are two alternatives to our methodology. These are 
switching regressions (De Melo, Cevdet and Gelb 1996), and lagged regressions 
(Brenton, Izvorski and Van Rooden 1998; Merlevede 2003). The switching approach 
uses dummy variables to capture policy impacts over a certain period. This technique 
can be used on a single policy, but it is impossible to apply it to a continuous reform 
process with a range of different policies in operation. 
The lagged regressions employ current and two lagged terms of the policy 
variables to examine the policy effects. Brenton, Izvorski and Van Rooden (1998) found 
negative coefficients for the current year variables, and in some regressions positive 
coefficients for the following two lagged periods. But when more variables were 
introduced those results were not robust. Other drawbacks were the difficulty of 
identifying the lag order from a short data series, and sacrificing the early part of the 
series. The latter issue resulted in the loss of both degrees of freedom and information, 
which was of particular concern as the early transition period was likely to be the most 
important for understanding reform impacts on growth. Finally, by itself a lagged 
regression is unable to distinguish speed effects from level effects. 
To compare alternative models, for simplicity, we examine price liberalisation. 
Table VI presents the results from three alternative specifications. Panel VI.A provides 
the comparator that follows our methodology. As can be seen, the three control variable 
estimates are again consistent and robust across the three different specifications.  
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However the estimated parameters of the policy variable are different across 
panels. As can be seen, analogous to the work of Brenton, Izvorski and Van Rooden 
(1998) and Merlevede (2003), panel VI.B suggests an immediate negative impact from 
increased price liberalisation, followed by two positive effects in the two subsequent 
periods, though the second one is insignificant. The summation of the two significant 
coefficients appears to suggest an overall negative effect from price liberalisation. 
However, that of all three coefficients provides the opposite result. This is rather 
confused.  
Now if we add a speed effect, as in panel VI.C, the coefficient on the speed 
variable is the largest with a negative sign, and has the largest t value amongst the four 
price liberalisation variables, though all the four variables become insignificant. The 
sum of the coefficients of the three level variables is negative, which is consistent with 
the results of panel VI.A. Above all, these results suggest that the speed variable does 
reveal important information, and that the comparator specification is competitive with 
the lagged versions.        
IV.B. Evidence of Stabilization after 1995 
By the end of the first half of the 1990s, with rapid price liberalisation, most if 
not all of the technically easy and politically acceptable policies had been implemented, 
and further progress in that dimension would have required freeing public utility prices, 
and eliminating politically sensitive subsidies. By the mid 1990s it was widely accepted 
that prudent fiscal and monetary policies were necessary to avoid the damaging 
consequences of high and variable inflation rates. As a result, wild movements in 
macroeconomic aggregates, and often brutal but rapid transition progress were replaced 
by stabilisation packages and incremental changes in transition indicators. There was 
further turmoil and backsliding – most spectacularly in the Russian crash of 1998 – but 
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the character of the transition process had changed. It is worth seeing if the data reflect 
that change.  
Using a large number of dummies in the panel data analysis vitiates the widely 
used Chow test for coefficients’ stability or a structural shift, especially when an LSDV 
analysis is employed. Instead, general comparisons are possible by splitting the sample, 
and then comparing the results from sub-samples with the full sample equation. Table 
VII presents the estimates, where again we concentrate on a partial regression with the 
most promising policy variable, price liberalisation. 
Although there are clear differences between the two sub-periods, most 
properties remain consistent. In the early transition period, the destructive speed effect 
of price liberalisation on growth is significant, though its level and the impact of 
inflation are insignificant. In the second period both the level and the speed of price 
liberalisation variables are insignificant. This suggests a less damaging impact in the 
second period. In addition, the greater sum of squared errors during 1991-1995 with a 
relative small sample confirms the relatively greater volatility of the first period, and 
thus the relative stability of the second period. The extreme volatility of inflation in the 
first period may even account for our failure, against the logic of the analysis of this 
section, to discover a significant link to growth.         
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses the framework of conditional growth convergence to examine 
the impact of transition policies on economic growth conditioned on three robust control 
variables. It decomposes eight transition indicators into two sets of variables - level and 
speed, and then investigates them using general-to-specific as well as partial regression 
in a two-stage analysis.  
 24 
The dominant link between transition indicators and growth is found to be 
generally negative. There is clear evidence that the price liberalisation, enterprise 
reform, and competition policy are negatively associated with growth. It is argued that 
given the specific conditions during the transition, such effects could have been 
expected. By contrast, trade liberalisation has a positive association while no significant 
link is found between growth and financial sector reforms.  
We should be clear what these results mean. They do not imply that in well 
functioning market systems there is no positive output effect from price liberalisation, 
competition policy, privatisation, enterprise or financial sector reform. They do imply 
that, taken as a whole, and given the ways in which such structural changes were made 
in transition states during 1991-2000, there was no identifiable output benefit to the 
policies. Our results do not imply that transition states cannot or will not benefit from 
such structural reforms. They do imply that they did not benefit during the first decade 
of transition.  
The transition reform results are placed in the context of the standard empirical 
growth literature by including three control variables. These show a consistently 
significant negative link between inflation and growth; an explained fast convergence 
rate; and a positive link between growth and the ratio of investment to GDP. Taken 
together these factors are more consistent and determining than the structural reform 
policies.   
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TABLE I - DESCRIPTION AND SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
        Variable Description Category 
Code  Dependent Control Level Speed 
R Per capita growth rate of GDP (PPP) √    
X1 Log of GDP per capita lagged one period  √   
X2 Log of annual inflation rate  √   
X3 Investment share in GDP  √   
Z1 EBRD index of price liberalisation   √  
    1
Zr  Change rate of Z1    √ 
Z2 EBRD index of trade liberalisation    √  
    2
Zr  Change rate of Z2    √ 
Z3 EBRD index of small-scale privatisation    √  
    3
Z
r  Change rate of Z3    √ 
Z4 EBRD index of large-scale privatisation    √  
    4
Zr  Change rate of Z4    √ 
Z5 EBRD index of enterprise reform    √  
    5
Z
r  Change rate of Z5    √ 
Z6 EBRD index of competition policy    √  
    6
Z
r  Change rate of Z6    √ 
Z7 EBRD index of banking sector reform    √  
    7
Z
r  Change rate of Z7    √ 
Z8 
EBRD index of reform of non-banking 
financial institutions  
  √  
    8
Z
r  Change rate of Z8    √ 
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TABLE II - CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 r X1 X2 X3 Z1 1Zr  Z2 2Zr  Z3 3
Z
r  Z4 4Zr  Z5 5
Z
r  Z6 6
Z
r  Z7 7
Z
r  Z8 8
Z
r  
r 1.000 -0.069 -0.658 -0.034 0.313 -0.541 0.464 -0.326 0.537 -0.411 0.434 -0.181 0.456 -0.191 0.293 -0.173 0.451 -0.173 0.378 -0.022 
X1 -0.069 1.000 -0.079 0.263 0.025 0.004 0.262 -0.051 0.194 0.041 0.305 0.016 0.348 -0.022 0.337 0.013 0.361 0.024 0.336 0.084 
X2 -0.658 -0.079 1.000 -0.029 -0.377 0.399 -0.632 0.313 -0.652 0.387 -0.593 0.234 -0.635 0.209 -0.380 0.177 -0.658 0.252 -0.462 0.058 
X3 -0.034 0.263 -0.029 1.000 -0.197 0.101 -0.176 -0.071 -0.183 -0.049 0.031 0.022 0.056 -0.097 0.161 0.054 0.023 -0.020 0.161 0.031 
Z1 0.313 0.025 -0.377 -0.197 1.000 -0.056 0.710 -0.062 0.670 -0.115 0.570 0.064 0.557 0.117 0.395 -0.049 0.606 0.142 0.383 0.038 
1Zr  -0.541 0.004 0.399 0.101 -0.056 1.000 -0.231 0.471 -0.345 0.249 -0.282 0.170 -0.304 0.038 -0.202 0.054 -0.298 0.060 -0.237 0.015 
Z2 0.464 0.262 -0.632 -0.176 0.710 -0.231 1.000 -0.045 0.817 -0.226 0.723 -0.064 0.755 0.004 0.481 -0.085 0.817 0.005 0.544 0.081 
2Zr  -0.326 -0.051 0.313 -0.071 -0.062 0.471 -0.045 1.000 -0.238 0.342 -0.213 0.362 -0.222 0.266 -0.167 0.111 -0.231 0.268 -0.262 0.027 
Z3 0.537 0.194 -0.652 -0.183 0.670 -0.345 0.817 -0.238 1.000 -0.256 0.800 -0.100 0.773 -0.089 0.570 -0.060 0.798 -0.107 0.624 0.040 
3Zr  -0.411 0.041 0.387 -0.049 -0.115 0.249 -0.226 0.342 -0.256 1.000 -0.288 0.311 -0.248 0.175 -0.200 0.148 -0.270 0.125 -0.309 0.045 
Z4 0.434 0.305 -0.593 0.031 0.570 -0.282 0.723 -0.213 0.800 -0.288 1.000 -0.035 0.781 -0.104 0.652 -0.079 0.774 -0.138 0.671 0.020 
4Zr  -0.181 0.016 0.234 0.022 0.064 0.170 -0.064 0.362 -0.100 0.311 -0.035 1.000 -0.120 0.268 -0.141 0.144 -0.084 0.306 -0.275 0.035 
Z5 0.456 0.348 -0.635 0.056 0.557 -0.304 0.755 -0.222 0.773 -0.248 0.781 -0.120 1.000 0.086 0.695 -0.022 0.888 -0.073 0.727 0.067 
5Zr  -0.191 -0.022 0.209 -0.097 0.117 0.038 0.004 0.266 -0.089 0.175 -0.104 0.268 0.086 1.000 -0.110 0.235 -0.007 0.537 -0.172 0.125 
Z6 0.293 0.337 -0.380 0.161 0.395 -0.202 0.481 -0.167 0.570 -0.200 0.652 -0.141 0.695 -0.110 1.000 0.115 0.615 -0.146 0.753 -0.009 
6Zr  -0.173 0.013 0.177 0.054 -0.049 0.054 -0.085 0.111 -0.060 0.148 -0.079 0.144 -0.022 0.235 0.115 1.000 -0.010 0.179 -0.076 0.127 
Z7 0.451 0.361 -0.658 0.023 0.606 -0.298 0.817 -0.231 0.798 -0.270 0.774 -0.084 0.888 -0.007 0.615 -0.010 1.000 0.064 0.711 0.042 
7Zr  -0.173 0.024 0.252 -0.020 0.142 0.060 0.005 0.268 -0.107 0.125 -0.138 0.306 -0.073 0.537 -0.146 0.179 0.064 1.000 -0.178 0.046 
Z8 0.378 0.336 -0.462 0.161 0.383 -0.237 0.544 -0.262 0.624 -0.309 0.671 -0.275 0.727 -0.172 0.753 -0.076 0.711 -0.178 1.000 0.146 
8Zr  -0.022 0.084 0.058 0.031 0.038 0.015 0.081 0.027 0.040 0.045 0.020 0.035 0.067 0.125 -0.009 0.127 0.042 0.046 0.146 1.000 
Data are from 1991 to 2000 and total observations are 225. 
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TABLE III - PARTIAL REGRESSIONS   
 
Panel 
III.A 
Panel 
III.B 
Panel 
III.C 
Panel 
III.D 
Panel 
III.E 
Panel 
III.F 
Panel 
III.G 
Panel 
III.H 
Constant term 
1.472 
(6.26)*** 
1.418 
(6.18)*** 
1.446 
(6.40)*** 
1.568 
(6.18)*** 
1.618 
(7.30)*** 
1.552 
(7.17)*** 
1.528 
(7.05)*** 
1.463 
(6.53)*** 
Ln (GDP per capita 
one period lagged) 
-0.172 
(6.32)*** 
-0.175 
(6.43)*** 
-0.176 
(6.55)*** 
-0.180 
(6.67)*** 
-0.183 
(6.83)*** 
-0.175 
(6.52)*** 
-0.177 
(6.51)*** 
-0.169 
(5.85)*** 
Ln (Inflation rate) 
-0.0451 
(5.56)*** 
-0.0385 
(3.95)*** 
-0.0446 
(4.97)*** 
-0.0517 
(5.94)*** 
-0.0538 
(5.83)*** 
-0.0472 
(5.63)*** 
-0.0514 
(5.38)*** 
-0.0475 
(5.56)*** 
The ratio of Investment 
to GDP 
0.0019 
(2.81)*** 
0.0014 
(1.99)** 
0.0015 
(2.03)** 
0.0015 
(2.09)** 
0.0013 
(1.80)* 
0.0016 
(2.24)** 
0.0014 
(1.95)* 
0.0014 
(1.91)** 
Z1 
-0.0109
 
 
(0.76) 
       
Price  
liberalisation 
1Zr  
-0.0734 
(4.40)*** 
       
Z2  
0.0165
 E
 
(1.66)* 
      
Trade 
liberalisation 
2Zr   
-0.0296
E
 
(2.35)** 
      
Z3   
0.0134
 
 
(1.08) 
     
Small-scale 
privatisation 
3Zr    
-0.0348
E
 
(2.02)** 
     
Z4     
-0.0184 
(1.50) 
    
Large-scale 
privatisation  
4Zr     
0.0083 
(0.54) 
    
Z5     
-0.0288
E
 
(1.50) 
   
Enterprise  
reform 
5Zr      
-0.0129 
(0.76) 
   
Z6       
-0.039 
(2.23)** 
  
Competition 
policy 
6Zr        
0.0073
 
 
(0.41) 
  
Z7        
-0.0101
E
 
(0.64) 
 
Banking sector 
reform 
7Zr         
0.0054 
(0.31) 
 
Z8         
-0.0160 
(1.00) Non-banking 
financial reform 
8Zr          
0.0195
 
 
(1.06) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.672 0.643 0.640 0.635 0.641 0.642 0.632 0.634 
F-test of fixed country 
and time effects 
3.581 
(0.000) 
4.102 
(0.000) 
3.666 
(0.000) 
4.313 
(0.000) 
4.293 
(0.000) 
4.416 
(0.000) 
4.283 
(0.000) 
4.138 
(0.000) 
Hausman’s test of fixed 
against random effects  
15.01 
(0.010) 
15.95 
(0.007) 
16.53 
(0.005) 
20.64 
(0.001) 
20.92 
(0.001) 
20.70 
(0.001) 
18.95 
(0.002) 
20.92 
(0.001) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test on exogeneity  
-- 
19.70 
(0.000)** 
4.66 
(0.031)** 
-- 
10.26 
(0.001)*** 
-- 
4.63 
(0.032)** 
-- 
Superscript 
E
 denotes rejection of the exogeneity of the corresponding variable.  t-statistics in parentheses, 
with * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. All test statistics are reported with p-values in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE IV - PARTIAL REGRESSION WITH INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES  
 
 
Panel 
IV.A 
Panel  
IV.B 
Panel 
IV.C 
Panel  
IV.D 
Constant term 
1.799 
(7.08)*** 
1.476 
(6.47)*** 
1.975 
(7.95)*** 
1.588 
(7.32)*** 
Ln (GDP per capita 
one period lagged) 
-0.204 
(7.35)*** 
-0.178 
(6.59)*** 
-0.193 
(7.32)*** 
-0.162 
(5.78)*** 
Ln (Inflation rate) 
-0.0504 
(4.31)*** 
-0.0484 
(5.24)*** 
-0.0775 
(6.41)*** 
-0.0716 
(5.13)*** 
The ratio of Investment 
to GDP 
0.0011 
(1.62) 
0.0016 
(2.23)** 
0.0013 
(1.81)* 
0.0016 
(2.17)** 
Transition variables     
Z2 
-0.0177 
(1.06) 
   
Trade 
liberalisation 
2Zr  
-0.0752 
(3.45)*** 
   
Z3  
0.0057
 
 
(0.44) 
  
Small-scale 
privatisation 
3Zr   
0.0832 
(1.32) 
  
Z5   
-0.1455 
(3.32)*** 
 
Enterprise  
reform 
5Zr    
0.0370 
(1.56) 
 
Z7    
-0.0841 
(2.06)** Banking sector 
reform 
7Zr     
0.0376 
(1.57) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.660 0.636 0.657 0.639 
Sargan’s specification 
test on instruments 
2.211 
(0.988) 
2.479 
(0.981) 
2.792 
(0.972) 
2.744 
(0.974) 
t-statistics in parentheses, with * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All test statistics are reported with p-values in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE V - GENERAL-TO-SPECIFIC REGRESSION 
 
Explanatory Variables Panel V.A Panel V.B Panel V.C Panel V.D Panel V.E 
Constant term 
1.313 
(4.944)*** 
1.256 
(5.844)*** 
1.263 
(4.562)*** 
1.317 
(5.540)*** 
0.998 
(4.478)*** 
Ln (GDP per capita one period lagged) 
-0.146 
(4.829)*** 
-0.147 
(5.740)*** 
0.151 
(5.605)*** 
-0.150 
(5.106)*** 
0.122 
(4.666)*** 
Ln (Inflation rate) 
-0.0336 
(3.322)*** 
-0.0344 
(3.845)*** 
0.0375 
(3.633)*** 
-0.0367 
(2.932)*** 
-- 
 
 
The ratio of Investment to GDP 
0.0024 
(3.218)*** 
0.0023 
(3.356)*** 
0.0022 
(3.136)*** 
0.0024 
(3.248)*** 
-- 
Z1 
-0.0168 
(1.028) 
-- -- -- -- 
Price 
liberalisation 
1Zr  
-0.0670 
(3.600)*** 
-0.0769 
(4.829)*** 
-0.0778 
(4.982)*** 
-0.0722 
(4.409)*** 
-0.0770 
(4.720)*** 
Z2 
0.0286 
(2.442)** 
0.0165 
(1.080) 
0.0241 
(2.529)** 
0.0213 
(0.931) 
0.0364 
(4.026)*** 
Trade liberalisation 
2Zr  
-0.0048 
(0.320) 
-- -- -- -- 
Z3 
-0.0103 
(0.740) 
-- -- -- -- 
Small-scale 
privatisation 
3Zr  
-0.0400 
(2.320)** 
-0.0362 
(2.006)** 
-0.0324 
(2.033)** 
0.0759 
(1.224) 
-0.0334 
(1.960)* 
Z4 
-.0.0268 
(2.097)** 
-0.0176 
(1.429) 
-0.0203 
(1.787)* 
-0.0150 
(1.089) 
-0.0112 
(0.939) Large-scale 
privatisation 
4Zr  
0.0179 
(1.129) 
-- -- - -- 
Z5 
-0.0086 
(0.402) 
-- -- -- -- 
Enterprise 
reform 
5Zr  
-0.0229 
(1.136) 
-0.0254 
(1.785)* 
-0.0270 
(1.960)** 
-0.0331 
(2.150)** 
-0.0355 
(2.424)** 
Z6 
-0.0376 
(2.086)** 
-0.0321 
(2.110)** 
-0.0342 
(2.335)** 
-0.0334 
(2.081)** 
-0.0372 
(2.419)** 
Competition policy 
6Zr  
0.0122 
(0.670) 
-- -- -- -- 
Z7 
-0.0029 
(0.169) 
-- -- -- -- 
Banking sector reform 
7Zr  
-0.0045 
(0.220) 
-- -- -- -- 
Z8 
-0.0134 
(0.837) 
-- -- -- -- 
Transition 
Variables 
Non-banking financial 
reform 
8Zr  
0.0097 
(0.549) 
-- -- -- -- 
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TABLE V – (CONTINUED) 
Explanatory Variables Panel V.A Panel V.B Panel V.C Panel V.D Panel V.E 
Adjusted R
2
 0.690 0.697 0.681 0.688 0.655 
F-test of fixed country effects 4.054 (0.000) 4.663 (0.000) -- -- -- 
F-test of fixed time effects 2.010 (0.041) 1.902 (0.054) -- -- -- 
Hausman’s test of fixed against random 
effects (LM test) 
16.51 (0.623) 14.59 (0.103) -- -- -- 
F-test for joint restriction on 
reduced Panel V.B against V.A 
0.542 (0.863) --   
Sargan’s specification test  
on instruments 
-- -- 
1.338 
(0.931) 
1.964 
(0.999) 
-- 
The regression method is two-way LSDV. Panel V.C uses the omitted transition variables as 
instrumental variables, and alternatively panel V.D uses lagged variables as instruments; t-statistics 
in parentheses, with * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. All test statistics are reported with 
p-values in parentheses. Sargan’s specification test is the chi-squared statistic. 
 
 
TABLE VI - COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Specification Panel VI.A Panel VI.B Panel VI.C 
Constant term 
1.472          
(6.26)*** 
1.443                 
(6.049)*** 
1.428                
(6.23)*** 
Ln (GDP per capita one period 
lagged) 
-0.172           
(6.32)*** 
-0.174          
(6.40)*** 
-0.170        
(6.23)*** 
Ln (Inflation rate) 
-0.0451             
(5.56)*** 
-0.0416           
(4.996)*** 
-0.0428      
(5.10)*** 
 
The ratio of Investment to 
GDP 
0.0019        
(2.81)*** 
0.0020           
(2.896)*** 
0.0021      
(2.949)*** 
Z1 
-0.0109            
(0.76) 
-0.056          
(3.491)*** 
-0.0244          
(0.752) 
Z1(-1) -- 
0.046           
(2.815)*** 
0.010              
(0.280) 
Z1(-2) -- 
0.013              
(1.029) 
0.013              
(1.034) 
price liberalisation 
1Zr  
-0.0734        
(4.40)*** 
-- 
-0.0495              
(1.122) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.672 0.671 0.671 
F-test of fixed country and time 
effects 
3.581 (0.000) 3.752 (0.000) 3.512 (0.000) 
Hausman’s test of fixed against 
random effects 
15.01 (0.010) 17.04 (0.009) 15.41 (0.031) 
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TABLE VII – COMPARISON OF VOLATILITY  
Data set 1991-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 
Constant term 
1.472         
(6.26)*** 
2.076          
(4.08)*** 
3.471       
(6.416)*** 
Ln (GDP per capita one period 
lagged) 
-0.172        
(6.32)*** 
-0.254       
(4.25)*** 
-0.406       
(6.46)*** 
Ln (Inflation rate) 
-0.0451       
(5.56)*** 
-0.0180         
(0.919) 
-0.0323    
(3.090)*** 
 
The ratio of Investment to 
GDP 
0.0019        
(2.81)*** 
0.0024         
(2.23)** 
0.0020       
(1.609)** 
Z1 
-0.0109            
(0.76) 
-0.0118           
(0.63) 
-0.0371         
(1.639) 
Price liberalisation 
1Zr  
-0.0734      
(4.40)*** 
-0.0584      
(2.598)** 
-0.0177         
(0.266) 
Sum of squared errors 0.5794 0.2988 0.1076 
Adjusted R
2
 0.672 0.651 0.465 
F-test of fixed country and time 
effects 
3.581 (0.000) 2.617 (0.001) 3.743 (0.000) 
Hausman’s test of fixed against 
random effects 
15.01 (0.010) 13.51 (0.019) 20.87 (0.000) 
Observations 225 102 123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
       Several types of initial conditions have been discussed in the transition literature (Shleifer 1997; 
Krueger and Ciolko 1998; Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 1999; and Fischer and Sahay 
2000). However, per capita output or income is pre-dominant in the growth literature.    
 
